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The Municipal Utility and the
Liberal Economic Ethic
Charles S. Telly*
Jack F. Grove**
7he municipally owned and operatedutility is something ofan anomoly when it is
viewedfrom an economic standpoint. While representing a ratherpure/orm 0fgov-
ernment ownershp of a business enterprise, the municipal utility nonetheless com-
ports with most of the classical tenets of the liberal economic ethic. After briefly
tracing the development of that ethic, the authors analyze the municipal utility in
light ofHome Rule, monopoly regulation, and the ability of such a utility to meet the
demands and needs of contemporary society. The authors conclude that the munici-
pal utility, because of its size, local focus, and adherence to the liberal economic
ethic, is an idea to be lauded rather than criticized
INTRODUCTION
Since the great period of the eighteenth century, which engen-
dered the basic American economic and political philosophy,
government ownership of business has been considered an anath-
ema to a free society. Before the drastic changes in thought of the
1930's, the underlying theme had been that society operated under
the belief that people were born with natural, inalienable rights to
seek benefits in the marketplace to the enhancement of self-inter-
est. This theme was anchored on the principle that "government
[was] created for the purpose of protecting but not depriving [indi-
viduals] of their rights, for men will be guided in their transactions
by what is good for them, and hence, good for society as a
whole."'
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of Arizona; Ph.D. (1967), University of Washington; LL.M. (1977), Columbia University
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Law. The author is associated with the firm of Randolph, Froelke, Thomas and Schnell in
Hamilton, Ohio.
The authors wish to extend special thanks to John C. Engle, Director of Utilities, Ham-
ilton, Ohio, for his valuable assistance in the collection of information for this article and
especially for his imaginative perspective, from the management viewpoint, on the value of
Home Rule.
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The coupling of an individual's inalienable rights with a "pro-
tecting" government proved a fertile environment for business en-
terprise. This system, however, had its faults, and beginning in
the 1930's, governmental intervention assumed an increasingly
significant role in the play of economic and business matters.
Many industries became subject to the watchful eye of govern-
ment, and the traditional view of freedom in the market place suf-
fered. Nonetheless, the underlying assumption remaining
throughout society was that as little government ownership as pos-
sible should be tolerated.
In 1935, the federal government became involved in the regu-
lation of public utilities.2 Prior to this, only the individual state
public utility commissions regulated them, especially in the mat-
ters of rates, services, entry, and expansion. Yet, public utilities,
though government regulated, are generally (with a few excep-
tions such as the Tennessee Valley Authority) privately owned.
The municipal utility is an example of an entity which is pub-
licly, not privately owned. This special feature of local public
ownership removes its operation from much of the state and fed-
erally imposed regulation that prevails over the utility industry at
large. The municipal utility is undoubtedly an anomaly in twenti-
eth century business. However, despite much criticism, the mu-
nicipal utility does not negate the democratic theme, but rather
supports it in a unique way, because of the utility's small size,
purely local interest, and adherence to one of the central liberal
economic principles-profit.
This article will examine the municipal utility, its economic,
legal, and political setting, and how it relates to traditional liberal
economic principles. However much overlooked, the municipal
utility needs to be carefully examined and supported for no
greater reason than because it is an idea of merit.
I. THE LIBERAL ECONOMIC ETHIC
The current antagonism toward the creation or survival of mu-
nicipally owned utilities stems from the anomalous position that
such publicly owned institutions occupy in the American concept
of economic freedom. How such a concept developed and how
this anomaly was created will be the focus of this section of the
article.
2. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-687, 49 Stat. 837
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970)).
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Every society must confront, in one way or another, three fun-
damental and interdependent problems: (1) what commodities
shall be produced and in what quantities; (2) how these goods
shall be produced; and (3) for whom shall these goods be pro-
duced.3 In answering these central economic questions, the
United States has focused on the changing relationships of free-
dom and order.4 In the early stages of this nation's development,
individual freedom in economic life was highly emphasized. In a
broader sense, the ideal norm of the early American experience
was expressed in terms of "Classical Economic Theory"-the ge-
neric term for that body of thought which was synthesized and
developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Adam
Smith and his economic disciples.5
Underlying this theory are two basic tenets: (1) the "doctrine
of the free and responsible individual"6 and (2) the notion of a
natural order in the universe revealed to all men through the
power of reason.7 By following this natural order, man was free to
pursue economic self-interest, and thus free enterprise became
recognized as a means to individual freedom.
An essential element of individual freedom was the right to
own property,8 the significance of which was the existence of the
right to exercise control over the use of things owned. Thus, prop-
erty rights came to be viewed as the source of economic freedom
for the individual. Under the stimulus of the profit motive, indi-
viduals were willing to bear risk in a free market economy. Com-
petition forced the market to self-regulate. Therefore, pursuit of
self-interest in private property facilitated the natural economic
order that worked toward a long-term equilibrium.
One additional principle-laissez-faire-contributed to this
free and natural order. This theory calls for minimal governmen-
tal interference in economic affairs. It "grew naturally out of the
concept that the individual and not the state is the primary object
of [economic] concern ' 9 and coincided with the view of theorists
that concentrated political interference in the economic forum is a
3. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 14-15 (9th ed. 1964).
4. T. PETrr, FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 1 (1964).
5. The principal exponents of this doctrine-aside from Smith-were: Robert
Malthus, David Ricardo, James Mill, J.B. Say, N.W. Senior, John Stuart Mill, J.E. Cairnes,
and Henry Fawcett. Telly, supra note 1, at 406-507.
6. T. PETrr, supra note 4, at 119.
7. Id at 95.
8. For an in-depth discussion of this right, see Telly, supra note 1, at 406-507.
9. T. PETIT, supra note 4, at 119.
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threat to individual freedom.10
These concepts of individualism, private property, and laissez-
faire fostered capitalism and developed into the functional ethic of
the American economy under the liberal economic model." I They
became the basis of an interpretation of freedom which was used
to justify the exemption of business enterprise from governmental
regulation and interference. The early status of laissez-faire in the
minds of the American people, however, was to be greatly eroded
by the discontent caused by the Great Depression. Critics of lais-
sez-faire complained that its preoccupation with individualism,
fostered in an agrarian society, was not suited to an industrialized
society. 12
The early New Deal administration "stumbled" its way into
attempting many things unprecedented in previous administra-
tions. 13 One historian believes that the New Deal had its own "in-
dependent, non-theoretical, purely pragmatic origins."' 4  But
whatever may be said about the New Deal, its policies of govern-
mental action and reaction were initiated to pull the nation out of
the Depression.
At this time, John Maynard Keynes effectively "rationalized"
or substantiated many of these New Deal actions.' 5 Keynesian
economic analysis, however, confficts with the classical theory that
economic freedom engenders economic order. Keynes postulated
that a capitalist economy is not self-regulating and will function at
less than full employment if allowed to operate without external
regulation. Thus, Keynes asserted that, contrary to traditional ec-
onomic theory, what is good for the individual is not necessarily
good for society. His solution was not to discard the classical eco-
10. This viewpoint is shared today by economic conservatives such as Milton Fried-
man. Friedman cautions against state paternalism by expressing the fear that excessive
governmental intervention will inevitably lead to socialism. Freedom and democracy can-
not exist in an economic environment which is heavily government-regulated. M. FRIED-
MAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9 (1967).
11. T. PETIT, supra note 4, at 118.
12. Hotelling, The Relation of Prices to Marginal Costs in an Optimum System, 7
ECONOMETRICA 151, 155 (1939). See also HOGSON, GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES 71 (1934). Hogson explains that with the increase in businesses taking the corpo-
rate form, the owner-entrepreneur has been replaced in management by salaried persons
and the shareholder. Individual enterprise has been largely replaced by corporate enter-
prise. The business form itself has thus grown where it now resembles government.
13. 0. TAYLOR, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 504 (1960).
14. Id at 504 n.7.
15. J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
(1936).
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nomic model, but rather to modify it, eliminating its flaws by per-
mitting governmental intervention in the model through fiscal
policy, monetary policy, and policies affecting consumption and
savings.
1 6
The New Deal swept aside laissez-faire economics in favor of
new policies that rejected the materialistic interpretation of free-
dom previously discussed.17 Individualism was sacrificed for col-
lective order under guided capitalism. Governmental controls
were acceptable if able to cure certain ills without working undue
deprivations on the economic freedom of group interests (such as
labor, business, agriculture, and the professions).18 Freedom and
order remained the primary ethical characteristics of the economic
system,19 but the most profound effect of guided capitalism was
the displacement of the free market as the ultimate source of eco-
nomic equilibrium. The functional tools of control, no longer
confined to competitive forces, took the form of an interdiscipli-
nary complex.20
16. See P. DEANE, THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC IDEAS, 175-80 (1978); R. GILL,
EVOLUTION OF MODERN ECONOMICS, 85-102 (1967); I. RMA, DEVELOPMENT OF ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS, 360-90 (1972).
17. Governmental activity in the name of public interests, while initially confronted
with formidable resistance in the courts, was eventually to find a hospitable judicial forum.
During the Depression years, the Supreme Court experienced a renaissance-like transfor-
mation, especially in interpreting the Constitution. The Justices, spurred to a new level of
deference to the Congress and state legislatures by the legal realist movement, exercised
judicial restraint in cases where economic controls were at issue. The era of legislative
supremacy was thus greeted by the demise of judicially protected laissez-faire, and the
pseudo-religious concepts of natural law were subordinated to the democratic values em-
bodied in positive law. Compare Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518
(1819) and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934) and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
18. See T. PErrr, supra note 4, at 240. The author views this approach as a "pluralis-
tic" concept of freedom, whereby policy makers consider the competing goals of interest
groups in formulating economic controls. Hence, an institutional reformation occurred
when New Deal-influenced political power was substituted for economic power as the
means to achieve economic freedom. Government regulation is a functional equivalent to
individual rights (of property, for example) insofar as it governs terms of access to power
and its use. Competition was replaced, therefore, as the sole institution determining the
economic value of legal rights. Professor Samuels explains that the effective rights of eco-
nomic significance are primarily a function of two forces: the relevant body of law (and its
moral counterpart) and market conditions. Under this system, the efficiency of allocation
is determined by rights in both respects. Samuels, Comments on the SocialResponsibility of
Public Utilities, in NEw CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC UTILITY MANAGEMENT 243, 250 (1974).
19. The operative premise of guided capitalism might read: economic freedom cannot
exist without a minimum level of economic order whatever its source. T. PETIT, supra note
4, at 196.
20. One author argues that even on a smaller scale, regulation of a public utility
should be based upon a blend of analyses, even when the focus of the regulation is pricing.
1980]
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Placing the task of providing an economic balance in the
hands of government-thereby establishing supremacy of political
power over economic power-has profoundly influenced this soci-
ety. It is axiomatic in an industrial society that for political power
to be effective, it must become concentrated where economic
power is concentrated.2" Stated simply, the result of this concen-
tration is "big" government possessing a plethora of regulatory
arms designed to preserve economic order.
On a value continuum with capitalism and socialism at far
poles, this nation's growth has shifted over time from capitalism to
a controlled economy. Such a step to a middle ground is indica-
tive of an attempt to reconcile the individualism and materialism,
traditionally associated with economic freedom under the liberal
ethic, with the idealistic values of economic order felt in contem-
porary society. This accommodation by contemporary liberalism
illustrates in large part an American dilemma: how to preserve
traditional values in such a controlled society.
It is the contention of this article that the liberal economic
ethic is still the central theme of modem American society and
where possible it should be allowed to remain supreme. Where
this is not possible, then as little encroachment on the theme as is
necessary should be tolerated. Where considerable governmental
intervention seems necessary, then as much of the theme should
be preserved as is practical. Throughout, however, there should
be an effort to preserve at least a part of the liberal economic ethic
as a foundation of traditional values so meaningful to the mainte-
nance of the democratic ideal.
II. THE PUBLIC UTILITY-THE CASE FOR MONOPOLY
REGULATION
In a capitalist economy, monopolies of any kind run contrary
to the basic theme of capitalism-freedom. A monopoly by its
very nature limits voluntary exchange by reducing the available,
alternative sources to which a consumer might turn.22 It is, in
short, a denial of competition caused by the over-development of
economic power. This concentration of economic power raises the
same fears that exist when political power becomes concen-
It is more than an exercise in legal procedures; regulation involves broader problems of
political economy. Massell, The Regulatory Process and Public UiityPe formance, in PER-
FORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 113, 113-14 (1968).
21. See T. PETIT, supra note 4, at 252.
22. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 28, 120.
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trated.23 Consequently, the monopoly is an undesirable economic
entity that government has actively sought to eliminate.
Within this framework, however, government has given the
public utility special consideration and permitted it to operate as a
monopoly.24 Two attributes of public utilities provide the basis
for such exceptional status: (1) the essential nature of the services
that bear an intimate relationship to the functioning of the com-
munity (such as electricity, gas, and water)25 and (2) the inherent,
technical characteristics which cannot be efficiently and economi-
cally sustained unless there is a monopoly.26 If competition is al-
lowed, there will be a duplication of resources (such as tracks,
cables, and substations) in a capital intensive industry.
The argument has been made that public utilities operate
23. C. WALTON, ETHOS AND THE ExECUTIVE 234 (1969).
24. One historical reason for this is that public utilities are "affected with a public(k)
[sic] interest." In an essay on ports of the sea, Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the
Kings Bench of England, referred to certain wharves in the above fashion. See McAllistor,
Lord Hale and Business .ffedted with a Public Interest, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 759 (1929-30);
Hamilton, Affection with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.L 1089 (1929-30). Two hundred years
later, the Supreme Court of the United States in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876),
reviewed state legislation regulating grain elevators and, among other things, fixing charges
for services rendered by Munn and an associate. The legislation was challenged as a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. Chief Justice Waite, in expressing
the constitutional issue, declared:
Looking, then, to the common law, from whence came the right which the Consti-
tution protects, we find that when private property is 'affected with a public inter-
est, it ceases to be jurisprivatli only.' This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale
more than two hundred years ago, in his treatise De Potibus Mars, 1 Harg. Law
Tracts, 78, and has been accepted without objection as an essential element in the
law of property ever since.
Id at 126. Subsequently, in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522
(1923), the idea emerged quite definitely as a "constitutional principle" which was applica-
ble to price regulation. But Chief Justice Taft resolved the group affected with a public
interest into classes, which primarily consisted of public utilities on one hand and those in
ordinary trade on the other. Id at 535.
In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Supreme Court changed its position
and eliminated the distinction between public and private business. Thereafter such a dis-
tinction became purely one of historical interest. Legislative proposals placing a particular
industry under price regulation may now be considered on their merits from the standpoint
of economic and social policy, unaffected by possible conflicts with traditional legal doc-
trines. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 7 (1969). The problem, how-
ever, is not yet solved. What was once a distinction between public utilities and trade
companies is not followed today, and the waters dividing public utilities (monopolies) and
trade companies (non-monopolies) are muddied.
25. J. BONBRIGHT, PUBLIC UTILITIES AND THE NATIONAL POWER POLICIES 5-7
(1940). Professor Bonbright belittles this generally accepted aspect of utility status con-
tending that it does not really raise the need for regulation. The service-community rela-
tionship does take on central importance, however, with the municipal utility. See also J.
BONBRIGHT, supra note 24, at 9-13.
26. Id
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under conditions of decreasing costs in contrast with competitive
enterprises which operate under conditions of constant or increas-
ing costs. Thus, the more output of a public utility plant per day,
month, or year, the lower the cost of production and distribution
of the kilowatt hour (or gas per thousand cubic feet or miles per
passenger). In the final analysis only the company which has a
monopoly of supply and service in a particular area can operate
economically at a maximum.27
Professor Bonbright makes it quite clear that the above posi-
tion must be carefully "qualified" for it to have significance, be-
cause the bald statement also relates to large-scale industrial
enterprise economies. The apparent difference is that the monop-
oly status of a public utility is not just a matter of size, nor is it due
to "any indefinite extension of the declining cost portion of a
curve relating unit costs of production to scale of output. ' 28
Rather, it pertains to the extremely localized and thus restricted
markets of the utility services. These markets are limited because
of the direct connection of the utility plant to the consumers'
homes. This competitive hindrance borne by utilities is of no con-
cern to an industrial enterprise whose potential market is not cir-
cumscribed by an inherently localized market.29
Moreover, Professor Bonbright emphasizes that an industrial
concern often realizes decreasing unit costs, but such costs may
prove illusory for a utility. Although any specified rate of output
can be supplied most economically by a particular single system,
the necessary use of an alternative system will reduce the econo-
mies of the former.
This concept can best be expressed by example. Assume that
three-fourths of a system comes from three extremely economical
hydro-electric plants, but no additional water power is available
within economical distance. New steam plants, which generate
power at a higher cost than hydro-electric plants, must be built.
Thus, power is being produced under increasing unit costs. These
unit costs may be increased even more if additional steam must be
produced to meet the growing requirements of the area. Of
27. Id See Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action in Two ESSAYS BY
HENRY CARTER ADAMS 57 (J. Dorfman ed. 1969). Adams states: "The control of the State
over industries should be co-extensive with the application of the law of increasing re-
turns." Id at 110.
28. See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 24, at 12.
29. See W. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 12-13 (2d ed.
1976).
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course, the increasing cost may be offset by the decline in unit cost
of the distribution system, but such a decline is not automatic.3 °
(This example applies to many utility companies today and
clearly characterizes the famous Tennessee Valley Authority with
its increasing dependence upon steam power due to the limits on
hydro-electric power.) Then, often because of the capital inten-
sive nature of the public utility and its unique relation to its cus-
tomers, it is more economical to have a public utility monopoly
than two or more companies in direct competition.
Because of their status as authorized monopolies, public utili-
ties are accorded special privileges not otherwise available to pri-
vate business enterprises.3' Privileges such as power of eminent
domain, permission to use public properties, and relative freedom
from competition through government protection against en-
croachment upon service territory32 are necessary safeguards of
public utility service.
Due to all of these factors, the utility stands as a long-term
exception to governmental non-interference with ordinary busi-
ness enterprise. It is subject to extensive government regulation,
which was accepted as the only alternative to outright government
ownership and to protect against the abuses of a private monopoly
operating without competitive controls. The special duties im-
posed by the regulatory processes in exchange for private monop-
oly status are basically the obligations to render adequate service
at reasonable rates without unjust discrimination between custom-
ers.
III. MUNICIPAL UTILITY V. PUBLIC UTILITY
What is the case for municipal ownership of a public utility?
It may be argued that even though public utilities are monopo-
listic enterprises which are heavily regulated, they continue to be
"free" enterprises owned by stockholders and managed by in-
dependent boards and chief executive officers.3 3 On the other
hand, the municipal utility is government-owned, and such own-
ership-critics argue-is another step toward the undesirable
30. See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 24, at 15.
31. See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 25, at 3.
32. Id
33. This article argues for the municipal utility in the present environment. It is not
intended as a critique of the public utility except as it pertains to the municipality. That
discussion must remain for another time.
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union of political and economic power.34 Furthermore, the con-
cept of a municipally owned business runs contrary to the warn-
ings of the classical economic theorists against the government
interfering with the natural laws of trade and discouraging indi-
vidual effort.
Professor Bonbright considers the argument that municipal
ownership of utilities is a complete combination of political and
economic power to be fallacious. The public utility is, in fact, a
private business which must make a profit despite being regulated.
When a utility is owned and operated by the municipality, there is
no reason why it should not make a profit as well.36
The significance of this statement becomes clear when one
compares services which produce a fair profit to services supplied
by the same municipality which are not intended to generate a fair
profit. The electricity will generally be sold at rates which yield a
revenue equal to cost plus debt-service charges. The costs are
carefully designed to have the beneficiary of the service bear the
burden, and thus the payment by the beneficiary will be based on
the use.
On the other hand, the costs for a city to maintain streets and
sidewalks, parks, public schools, health services, and a police sys-
tem will be met by taxation, with no corresponding effort made to
apportion the taxes according to the benefits each individual tax-
payer receives. Public schools, tuition-free and subject to compul-
sory attendance rules, provide an excellent example of this. All
taxpayers in the community will pay taxes to support the school
system whether they have children or not or whether their chil-
dren attend private schools. Since the consumer is unable to
choose how his income will be disposed of and what benefits he
wishes to receive in return for his income, it is easy to note that the
manner in which the city operates its schools and most public
services is quite dissimilar to that of a regular business. The polit-
ical and economic powers have been combined and are socialized.
34. See T. PETIT, supra note 4, at 267; see also M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10.
35. See, e.g., R. PORTER, THE DANGERS OF MUNICIPAL TRADING 21 (1907). Porter
argues that municipal ownership has no proper relationship to the duties which governing
bodies were expressly created to perform (ie., matters of police, health, and education).
Industrial and commercial speculation breeds corruption and creates an aristocracy of la-
bor-the "Socialist experience." Id The true duty of local government is to govern and
not to trade. Id Municipal leadership should not become involved in the acquisition or
management of industries that do not concern the welfare and happiness of all citizens of
the community. There should be no exception.
36. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 24, at 22-23.
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If the city provided free electric power to the citizens of the com-
munity, then, by the same reasoning, the utility system, too, would
be socialized. In such case, the public utility would no longer be a
business, and it would no longer be a public utility.
37
Drawing upon the foregoing analysis, Professor Bonbright the-
orizes that the consumers of public utility services should (1) be
allowed to have whatever types and amounts of service they are
willing to pay for, but (2) in return they must pay at rates that
both reflect the costs of producing those services and produce a
reasonable profit.38 If the municipal utility is left unregulated, it
will operate effectively, for the critical factor remains the extent to
which the entity is financially self-supporting.39
Moreover, Professor Bonbright states that public ownership of
a utility is not the potent catalyst of socialism that its critics would
make it.' If the country's industries are to be "socialized on a
wholesale basis, the expropriation of the utility systems will be but
a symptom of the movement, not a cause."4 In addition, the ten-
dency of utilities toward natural monopoly makes the argument
for public ownership simply inapposite to the case for a fully so-
cialized industrial economy.
Bonbright also notes that even under private ownership, public
utilities are much akin to government agencies.42 The privately
owned utility has legal powers which are usually reserved for gov-
ernment alone,43 and due to the extensive involvement of state
commissions in regulating privately owned utilities, the structure
and policies of these utilities frequently reflect the input of the
political forum.' Factors such as these place even the privately
owned utility on the borderline between business and govern-
ment.
45
This entanglement is magnified even further in larger consoli-
dated power companies which venture across state lines. These
37. Id at 23-24.
38. Id at 24.
39. Professor Bonbright believes this point is basic to prevailing theories of pricing for
public utility services and to his defense of long-term marginal cost. See . BONBRIGHT,
supra note 24, 120, 397-401.
40. J. BONBRIGTrr, supra note 25, at 58-59.
41. Id at 58.
42. Id at 59.
43. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
44. Id
45. Id In his final analysis, Professor Bonbright at least invited experimentation with
governmental ownership of utilities. See id at 69.
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companies must accede to the regulatory arms of more than one
state. Due to its large size, the business assumes a bureaucratic
organization similar to that of the agency which regulates it. Con-
sequently, the vestiges of free enterprise and individualism that
are retained through private ownership are lost in the functioning
of the large regulated utility.4'
The remarkable aspect of the municipal utility is the manner
in which it retains a truly liberal economic character despite the
feature of municipal ownership. Home Rule provisions, which
place the municipal utilities outside the state regulatory thicket,4 7
are largely responsible for this, as they enable the utilities to avoid
concentrations of political power operating in the regulatory com-
plex. Whatever political involvement is necessary to operate the
utility is exclusively local, thus optimizing the democratic values
and freedom which are so closely associated with liberalism. 4
Since distribution of utility services is essentially a local function,
regardless of the type of utility service or size of the enterprise,
local ownership optimizes the identity of interests among owner-
ship, management, and consumer.49 While this replaces self-inter-
est and private ownership as the motivating factors for successful
operation of the utility, individualism is preserved with the esprit
of the community, and sound business practices that meet the con-
sumer's needs are thus incorporated.
IV. ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE MUNICIPAL UTILITY THROUGH
THE HOME RULE AMENDMENTS IN OHIO
As noted above, municipal utilities avoid many of the difficul-
ties incumbent in state regulation through the power the munici-
pality retains under the Home Rule Amendments of the Ohio
Constitution.50 The general purpose of the Home Rule scheme, of
which the utility provisions are a significant part, is to establish
the municipal corporation as an autonomous unit within the su-
perstructure of the state and federal system.5 To accomplish this,
46. See id at 64.
47. See text accompanying notes 50-64 infra.
48. Cf. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 2-3 (advocating limited scope of government
with dispersal of power to local units). Opportunity for individual input is optimally en-
hanced when local, not state or federal, government is in control of regulation.
49. See E. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 559 (1950).
50. OHIO CONST. art. XVII, §§ 4-6. The amendments were added in 1912.
51. G. VAUBEL, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN OHIO § 2, at 11 (1978). One writer has
commented, "The urge for 'home rule' stirs the emotion of municipal officials. They want
freedom of action which they believe can come only from the guarantee of home rule to
[Vol. 30:267
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Home Rule allows for varying forms of municipal organization
with full governmental power except where specifically denied or
where in conflict with the general laws of the state. 2
The theoretical basis of constitutional Home Rule lies in a pe-
culiar form of liberalism that places more confidence in local and
private initiative than in the state. 3 The late eighteenth century
idea of progress embraced the notion that municipal privilege was
much the cause of that which modem enterprise and rationalism
were the effect. 4 In an age that exalted laissez-faire in both its
political and economic movements, the devolution of power to the
municipal government favoring local liberty was viewed with par-
ticular favor.55 Hence, one might note the close association of
constitutional Home Rule and the liberal economic ethic, an asso-
ciation which is all too frequently contrasted, especially in regard
to municipal ownership.
The thrust of Home Rule is the sustenance of local freedom,
56
and the operation and ownership of a municipal utility-an exer-
cise of exclusive municipal power-exemplifies the principle of
local freedom to the utmost.5 The municipality acts in a proprie-
tary function designed tWfurther community good.5 ' This propri-
etary status aligns the municipality in many respects with private
corporations as the legal obligations of the two are much the
same.5 9 Authority to act is broad-coextensive with the definition
of public utility-and the absence of any express constitutional
limitation on municipal power is an implied bar to state encroach-
ment through direct limitation upon municipal constitutional
their municipalities." J. FORDHAM, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICI-
PAL HOME RULE 1 (1953).
52. See generall, G. VAUBEL, supra note 51, § 3, at 15.
53. W. WICKWAR, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 30 (1970). The
author notes that the heritage of local government in the United States owes much to the
experience of the Prussian and Westphalian states and to the chairs of legal philosophy in
German universities. Id at 31-32. Local government shared in the freedom accorded pri-
vate initiative, and public responsibility was stressed in order to harmonize public and
private interests. Id Unimpeded by notions of ultra vires concerning the proper scope of
public service, the municipality was free to perform any positive role that served the citi-
zenry. For a discussion of social responsibility and the municipal utility, see text accompa-
nying notes 65-74 infra.
54. W. WICKWAR, supra note 53, at 39.
55. Id at 43.
56. See G. VAUBEL, supra note 51, § 27, at 385.
57. See id § 100, at 1106.
58. See id § 136, at 1395.
59. Id at 1395-96.
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power.60  The municipal power does have limitations, however,
when it runs in conflict with powers of the state of equal constitu-
tional dignity. Two such limitations are areas of "statewide con-
cern" 6' and areas where use of state police power is necessary to
sustain public welfare.62 The degree to which these limitations
will affect the Home Rule protection of local governments re-
mains unknown. However, if genuine Home Rule is to be at-
tained, the political and judicial climate in the state must be
favorable. The state must not interfere in local matters and the
courts must not too quickly sway the balance away from local in-
terest to that of the state. A broadly conceived constitutional
framework does not alone suffice.
The social and ethical values of the community which are
brought to bear upon the legislative and judicial branches of gov-
ernment condition the climate in which Home Rule must func-
60. Id at 1399-1400. See also Comment, Public Utilities Under Home Rule, 9 OHIo
ST. L.J. 141 (1948).
61. The Ohio Supreme Court considered the doctrine of "statewide concern" in
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75
(1968), where state legislation restricted the power of local government to regulate projects
within its territory. Justice Mathias' majority opinion provided a balancing standard in
analyzing the legislation before the court:
[E]ven if there is a matter of local concern involved, if the regulation of the sub-
ject matter affects the general public of the state as a whole more than it does the
local inhabitants the matter passes from what was a matter for local government
to a matter of general state interest.
Id at 129, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
This standard is an extremely deferential one and creates problems for the Home Rule
doctrine, largely because the standard of statewide concern is a function of time. Any issue
that gains the attention of the General Assembly should be of sufficient "general state
interest" to clear the low threshold of the test (as was transmission of electric power in the
Painesville case). While the court's concern for general laws is justified, the opinion has the
potential to accommodate the denial of municipal power under the auspices of Home Rule
whenever there is even a slight conflict with state legislation. For a further discussion of
the Painespille case see Vaubel, Of Concern to Painesville-Or Only to the State: Home Rule
in the Context of Utilities Regulation, 33 OHio ST. L.J. 257 (1972).
62. In City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 337 N.E.2d 766 (1975), the Ohio
Supreme Court was faced with an issue similar to that in Painesville-whether a local gov-
ernment had to accede to state infringement on its power of self-control. The City of Can-
ton had ignored an Ohio Environmental Protection Agency order to fluoridate its public
water supplies, declaring it had the right to decide what was in the best interest of the
community. In this case, the Court disagreed. Justice Stern, in his majority opinion, seem-
ingly merged the "statewide concern" issue into the question of the State's paramount po-
lice power. While recognizing home rule and general state police power as constitutionally
"equivalent in dignity," id at 66, 337 N.E.2d at 770, the majority clearly stated that when
the co-equals conflict, state power prevails. Id "An exercise of the police power necessar-
ily occasions some interference with other rights, but the exercise is valid if it bears a real
and substantial relationship to the public health, safety, moral or general welfare, and if it
is not unreasonable or arbitrary." Id at 68, 337 N.E.2d at 771.
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tion. A favorable opinion of Home Rule has an impact far
beyond the legislative or judicial outlook as it indicates the
broader popular understanding of the purpose of local control
that leads, in turn, to effective public articulation of its values, a
step crucial to the decisionmaking process. This popular under-
standing is of central importance to the identification of the liberal
economic values that support Home Rule and municipal owner-
ship and operation of public utilities.
The courts assume added significance in this process since they
not only must be able to reconcile competing state and municipal
interests, but they must also define, in a concrete fashion, the
scope of power distributed to municipalities by the Home Rule
Amendments. Two recent decisions indicate that the Ohio judi-
cial system is willing to take this crucial step and recognize the
significance of Home Rule authority.63 While in neither case does
the court draw any rigid distinctions, it does engage in a whole-
some discourse on competing values that affect its judgment in
Home Rule cases.64 So while the nature of constitutional Home
63. City of Columbus v. Ohio Power Siting Comm'n, 58 Ohio St. 2d 435, 390 N.E.2d
1208 (1979); City of Columbus v. Public Util. Comm'n, 58 Ohio St. 2d 427, 390 N.E.2d
1201 (1979).
64. In City of Columbus v. Public Util. Comm'n, 58 Ohio St. 2d 427, 390 N.E.2d 1201
(1979), the Ohio Supreme Court was called on to decide the extent to which Home Rule
curtails state power to exercise control over municipalities. Justice Holmes concluded that
not every impact upon municipal power is an unconstitutional restriction.
[W]here the state enacts a statute promoting a valid and substantial interest in
the public health, safety, morals, or welfare; where the statute's impact upon mu-
nicipal utilities is incidental and limited; and where the statute is not an attempt
to restrict municipal power to operate utilities, the statute will be upheld.
Id at 432, 390 N.E.2d at 1204. He maintained, however, that the statute must fail if its
purpose is to control or restrict municipal utilities. But, if a compelling interest on behalf
of the state can be shown, even a substantial burden flowing to the municipality should be
tolerated.
In a conclusory statement that is warmly sympathetic to Home Rule principle, Justice
Holmes declared: "We have no reason to suspect that the interests of a municipality's
electric heating customers will be better protected by the commission, an appointed body,
than by their elected municipal representatives." Id at 434, 390 N.E.2d at 1205. This
statement, of striking importance as ajudicial expression, recognizes in principle the man-
ner in which individualism is accommodated by municipal Home Rule over state regula-
tion. The case thus may be said to reflect the Court's belief that a municipality's citizen-
customer constituency is as capable of achieving sound utility operation through local
management as the state government in its regulation of its sector of the utility industry.
In a companion case, City of Columbus v. Ohio Power Siting Comm'n, 58 Ohio St. 2d
435, 390 N.E.2d 1208 (1979), the Court limited the Commission's right to interfere with the
city's Home Rule power. However, the Court did uphold the power of the state to assume
responsibilities should the environmental impact of the local decision extend beyond its
boundaries and become a matter of statewide concern. State action in such circumstances
is a valid exercise of police power by the state. The Commission was therefore left with the
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Rule in Ohio presents no categorical limitation to state encroach-
ment upon municipal self-determination of utility operations, the
tenor of the court's statements is favorable to continued municipal
autonomy.
V. THE MUNICIPAL UTILITY IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY-SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, POLITICAL
RESPONSIVENESS, AND PRICING POLICY
To understand the workings of the municipal utility properly,
its role in today's society must be assessed. At the present time,
theorists argue three isses: (1) social responsibility; (2) political
responsiveness of the owners; and (3) pricing policy. These issues
pertaining to the municipal utility shall be considered in greater
detail.
A. Social Responsibilify
The concept of the responsibility of the individual or entity to
the state or society is an ancient one. However, due to the exuber-
ance for liberal economic thought, it did not assume great signifi-
cance in American society until the Great Depression. E. Merrick
Dodd began the debate with his definitive article, "For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?," in the 1932 Harvard Law Review.
He maintained that a business organization are affected not only
by the laws which governed it, but also by the attitude of the pub-
lic concerning the obligations which it had to society. In his now
quite famous words, he stated:
That the duty of the managers is to employ the funds of the
corporate institution which they manage solely for the purposes
of their institution is indisputable. That that purpose, both fac-
tually and legally, is maximum stockholder profit has com-
monly been assumed by lawyers. That such is factually the
purpose of the stockholders in creating the association may be
granted. Nevertheless, the association once it becomes a going
concern, takes its place in a business world with certain ethical
standards which appear to be developing in the direction of in-
creased social responsibility. If we think of it as an institution
which differs in the nature of things from the individuals who
compose it, we may then readily conceive of it as a person,
which, like other persons engaged in business, is affected not
only by the laws which regulate business but by the attitude of
public and business opinion as to the social obligations of busi-
responsibility of weighing its determination of environmental impact against the munici-
pality's own determinations of need and evaluations of public service and convenience.
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ness.
65
It seems clear that this is in direct opposition to the traditional
view that a corporation owes a responsibility only to its sharehold-
ers. Just one year before, Adolph A. Berle, Jr. wrote an equally
significant article in the HarvardLaw Review entitled "Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust," where he presented that view. He
claimed:
It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a corpora-
tion or to the management of a corporation, or to any group
within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter
or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the
ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest ap-
pears. 66
After these two famous legal theorists, the debate over the role
of social responsibility in business has continued and remains a
controversial issue. One advocate of social responsibility main-
tains that the classical apologetic is untenable in modem society
and, consequently, a new ideology is needed. 67  On the other
hand, it has been vehemently argued that business should seek
only long-run profit maximization and not adhere to political or
social ideals which would lead to its ultimate destruction.68 "Cor-
porate welfare makes good sense if it makes good economic
sense. . . .But if something does not make economic sense, senti-
ment or idealism ought not let it in the door."' 69 Scholarship on
this issue abounds.7" However, the result remains that society
now expects more and more corporate responsibility and is begin-
ning to obtain it through never-ending government regulation. In
spite of the strong arguments against corporate responsibility, in
response to the acceptance of shifting social values in the commu-
65. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1045,
1159 (1932).
66, See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931).
67. Mason, The Apologetics of Managerialism, THE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1-11 (Jan.
1958). See also Austin, Responsibilityfor Social Change, HARV. Bus. REV. 45-52 (July-
Aug. 1965); Frederick, The Growing Concern Over Business Responsiblity, CAL. MANAGE-
MENT REV. 54-61 (Summer 1960).
68. Levitt, Dangers ofSocialResponsibility, HARV. Bus. REV. 41-50 (Sept.-Oct. 1958).
See also Donham, Is Management A Profession, HARV. Bus. REV. 60-68 (Sept.-Oct. 1962);
Peters, The Essential Values of Business, MANAGEMENT AND SocIrT 52-59 (1968).
69. Levitt, supra note 68, at 48.
70. H. JOHNSON, BUSINESS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: FRAMEWORK AND ISSUES
(1972); S. SETHI, THE UNSTABLE GROUND: CORPORATE SOCIAL POLICY IN A DYNAMIC
SOCIETY (1974); G. STEINER, ISSUES IN BUSINESS AND SOCIETY (1972). Seegenerally Mor-
ton, A Critical Vew of Managementr Assumption of Social Responsibilities, NEW CHAL-
LENGES TO PUBLIC UTILITY MANAGEMENT 213 (1974).
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nity, corporations are beginning to assume these "responsibilities"
voluntarily. This trend also reflects the various changes in corpo-
rate structure and methods of operation.7
Although both the large public utilities and the community-
oriented municipal utilities are subject to outside government reg-
ulation, the pressures the community exerts on each do vary.
Most people will not make many demands on the large interstate
public utility. Some pressure from the community does exist, but
any small community is but one segment of the utility's vast do-
main and any response will undoubtedly be impersonal. In con-
trast, since the municipal utility is relatively small and exists only
to serve the needs of the community in which it is located, it will
be most responsive to the pressures of that community.
An example of these pressures and the various responses of
the two utilities might be seen in the environmental costs of con-
ducting a utility enterprise.7" Many of the huge companies have
their enormous power plants near a particular community because
a water or coal service is there. Conservation efforts may help this
community, but they certainly do not help the profits of the public
utility. Thus, the utility will usually do as little as possible to re-
store the natural environment. On the other hand, the municipal-
ity will be willing to minimize the damage by its utility to its own
local environment. Its utility must bear costs of environmental
laundering of polluting facilities such as electric generating and
waste treatment plants.73 The municipality operating its own lo-
cal utility surely will obtain responsible environmental and con-
servation advice and act on it, since whatever is done will further
the interests of the community itself. However, should a munici-
pality abdicate this responsibility, state and federal authorities will
pursue more active measures to maintain environmental stan-
dards, resulting in an erosion of Home Rule autonomy.
B. Political Responsiveness
Large public utilities are stock corporations and, except for
71. T. PETIT, THE MORAL CRISIS IN MANAGEMENT 134 (1967). The author cites the
use of corporate largesse, expanding corporate bureaucracy, separation of ownership and
control, professionalization of management, and the diffusion of corporate property rights
as examples of such changes.
72. Air, water, and landscape pollution with attendant health hazards and aesthetic
distortions constitute prevalent technological diseconomies.
73. Environmental laundering is an example of reducing social costs otherwise suf-
fered due to smoke, smell, thermal, water, and noise pollution; encroachment on water
levels; and over-consumption of nonrenewable natural resources.
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federal and state regulation, are primarily controlled and operated
by a managerial elite. As Berle and Means write in their classic
work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property:
[Plarallel with the growth in the size of the industrial unit has
come a division in its ownership such that an important part of
the wealth of individuals consists of interests in great enter-
prises of which no one individual owns a major part .... 14
Frequently. . . ownership is so widely scattered that working
control can be maintained with but a minority interest. Under
such conditions control may be held by the directors or titular
managers who can employ the proxy machinery to become a
self-perpetuating body, even though as a group they own but a
small fraction of the stock outstanding.75
Furthermore, concerning the actual power and responsibility
of these large corporate systems, Berle and Means state:
A large body of security holders has been created who exercise
virtually no control over the wealth which they.., have con-
tributed to the enterprise .... 6 Henceforth, in the corporate
system the 'owner' of industrial wealth is left with a mere sym-
bol of ownership, while the power, the responsibility and the
substance. . . are. . . transferred to a separate group in whose
hands lies control.77
In contrast to the managerial elite who control public utilities,
the municipal utility management is directly linked to city man-
agement, the latter serving as an effective barometer of perform-
ance. The city's governing body, acting in a political capacity,
expresses the value preferences to which the utility management
must aspire. It becomes the pulse of public approval. To a de-
gree, then, the public gets the utility service it is willing to de-
mand, though it assumes the risk of mediocre performance should
it fail to insist upon responsible management of its utility enter-
prise. This risk, however, is one which the public must be willing
to accept in opting for the local freedom that Home Rule allows.
On the other hand, this freedom does allow the municipality to be
innovative in furthering its self-interest, the sort of innovation that
might otherwise be unavailable on a broader, state scale. Ideally,
method of operation and service pricing can be designed to com-
plement civic goals. This is the value of local seLf-determination.
The concept of social responsibility, however, does present a
74. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 66
(1933).
75. Id at 4-5.
76. Id
77. Id at 68.
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problem concerning the proper structure of power in economic
life. Although power is vital to the accomplishment of civic goals,
the public may fear the existence of concentrated economic power
and the abuses which might ultimately result therefrom. This fear
exists because public ownership is inevitably associated-and all
too often confused-with political ownership.78 Consequently,
there is no doubt that the success of public ownership will extend
only as far as it can be divorced from political patronage.
C. Pricing Policy
Of the three issues discussed here, pricing policy is perhaps the
most important because of the dangerous potential for political
abuse that is inherent within it. Governments, acting for politi-
cal purposes, might alter the method of pricing away from the
full cost method and thereby threaten the utility's ability to re-
main self-sustaining. To illustrate, in the 1930's Professor Harold
Hotelling advocated a different pricing method for utility services:
short-term marginal cost. He maintained that fully allocated costs
were unstable and led to cyclical fluctuations and uneconomical
use of labor and other resources.7 9 When shortages occurred,
Hotelling advocated the use of tax subsidies."0 His philosophy
was that the general welfare is promoted by "generous support of
projects for communal spending . ..without attempting to re-
cover from each enterprise its cost by charges for services ren-
dered by that enterprise."8 " To make services of the enterprise
fully available and thereby maximize the utilitarian objective,
Hotelling thought it necessary to eliminate consideration of such
costs in pricing policy. He also suggested that all prices should be
proportional to marginal costs, which could theoretically be ac-
complished if every commodity and service were subjected to a
tax proportional to its marginal costs.8 2
The danger of this approach is that by disregarding the utility's
self-sufficiency, it invites political over-involvement in utility op-
eration. If goals of sound utility practice are substituted for politi-
cal favors, the utility's institutional foundation will be severely
78. See E. CLEMENS, supra note 49, at 560.
79. Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway
and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1937). Hotelling relied on Jules Dupuit's thesis
that "the optimum of the general welfare corresponds to the sale of everything of marginal
cost." Id at 242.
80. Id at 257.
81. Id at 260.
82. See generally Hotelling supra note 12.
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undermined. The liberal values upon which any local utility oper-
ation depends for its freedom from state intervention would suc-
cumb to the socialization of the utility and to its concurrent
disregard of acceptable economic practice.
In addition to these theoretical objections pragmatic difficul-
ties exist with short-term marginal cost pricing. As Bonbright
notes, the great elasticity of short-term costs makes the short-term
marginal cost method of pricing extremely volatile.13 This insta-
bility does not serve consumer expectations that present rates indi-
cate that pricing will remain in effect for a considerable period.84
On the other hand, it is the anticipated long-run cost of service
which is taken into account when a consumer faces any business
decision.8"
A glittering example of the dangers of disregarding a utility's
self-sufficiency (thereby leading to political involvment) and of
the problems that arise when utility companies do not adhere to
long-run marginal costs can be seen in the following actual situa-
tion.
The Southern Company, one of the largest utilities in the
United States, serving Georgia and portions of Alabama, Missis-
sippi, and Florida, is unable to raise rates due to political restric-
tions. Because it lacks sufficient capital to operate, the company is
cutting back on necessary construction projects, possibly jeopard-
izing its future. Because it has fallen prey to the whims of politi-
cally controlled public service commissions, the company has also
been forced to reduce its peak hour reserve in future capacity from
the industry norm of 20 percent to a risky 15 percent. Should one
or more generating units break down, this reserve may prove in-
sufficient.
In a discussion of Southern's quandry, Edmund Faltermayer
relates:
These days Southern is in a permanent state of suspense about
what it will get in the way of rate relief. Of the four state com-
missions the Southern system deals with, only Florida's has be-
come reasonably accommodating in the last few years.
Mississippi is at the opposite pole; the rate increases it al-
83. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 24, at 323.
84. Id at 396.
85. In his discussion of marginal cost pricing, Bonbright expressed a preference for
long-run marginal cost pricing as the most important marginal costs for rate control are the
persistent marginal costs. He felt that such a pricing policy was superior not only from the
standpoint of optimum resource allocation, but also because it presented a less drastic de-
parture from the orthodox requirement of full cost pricing. Id at 401.
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lows-when it allows them at all-are so meager its rulings are
always appealed to the state courts. The Georgia and Alabama
commissions, which rule over the great bulk of the Southern
system's earnings, are somewhere in between but closer to Mis-
sissippi. Despite Georgia Power's brush with bankruptcy, that
state's commission in 1975 granted only one-third of a re-
quested permanent rate increase; last year, as noted, it granted
only half the utility's request and cut the allowed rate of return.
The real shocker, though, was the Alabama commission's June,
1976, decision on a request for a $106.8 million rate in-
crease. . . . [T]he commissioners chose, by a vote of two to
one, to give Alabama Power not one red cent.86
This utility is gradually losing its identity as an independent,
regulated utility and has become a "political football;" the result
of which can only be the bankruptcy of the company and the ulti-
mate takeover by the states involved. The liberal economic
tool-price-is being ignored to the detriment of all.
To avoid this depressing fate, a municipal utility should utilize
the pricing policies that reflect the liberal economic and political
basis upon which this form of local public ownership of business
was founded. Preservation of economic independence is essential
to shelter the municipal utility from state encroachment and polit-
ical abuse. To this end, a municipal business should be operated
in much the same manner as any privately owned business.
VI. OVERALL ANALYSIS
In Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "The Rime of the Ancient Mari-
ner,"87 an innocent, loving albatross is unjustifiably killed, and as
a result, the mariners suffer a terrible penalty. The municipal util-
ity, like the albatross, exists in danger of being ushered into ex-
tinction."8 Unlike the Coleridge theme, however, were the
termination of the municipal utility to occur, *nothing so drastic as
the mariner's fate would befall American democracy. On the con-
trary, if municipal utilities were to be extensively curtailed or
eradicated, the overall democratic setting would change little, for
they are, in fact, such a small part of the economic, legal, and
political setting. The point is, however, that the liberal economic
86. Faltermayer, THE HAMMERLOCK ON SOUTHERN CO., FORTUNE May 8, 1978, at
277.
87. S. Coleridge, "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," in IMMORTAL POEMS OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 269 (0. Williams ed. 1952).
88. There are those who differ, but as long as the corporate theme is growth-because
it is supposedly more efficient-then, the relatively small municipal utility is in danger of
being absorbed by the huge private utilities.
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goal of freedom remains important even with a supplemental pol-
icy of guided governmental intervention in the model. And, the
municipal utility is only one part of this economic, legal, political
whole. Yet, every part adds to the whole, and given the tremen-
dous inroads into the model that have been made, it seems that
that which retains the original goals with little or no crippling side
effects, no matter how small its effect, should be preserved.
Granted there is an anomaly-the municipal utility is a natu-
ral monopoly that is municipally owned. But this anomaly is off-
set by the insistence upon a pillar of the liberal economic
ideal-profit. Profit, as a component remains central since it dis-
allows government welfare expenditures. Those who benefit from
the municipal utility must pay for present and future costs.
Furthermore, this anomaly is offset by size, since the size of the
municipality is generally small, especially in comparison with
huge public utilities. The entire theme of freedom was invented
and initially developed in small city states. Rosseau in The Social
Contract89 and Schumacher in Small is Beautiful9° maintain that
small equals more democracy. And others have added that repre-
sentation of different geographic areas also increases and guaran-
tees democracy.91 Moreover, the constitutional sanction of the
municipal utilities and the lack of state and federal control add to
the ideal of small individual decisionmaking for the benefit of the
community.
Pitfalls such as politicalization, corruption, and bureaucratiza-
tion exist not only in government owned organization, but also in
huge public utilities of today. Yet these menacing pitfalls have
been held at a distinct minimum in small municipal utilities.
Consequently, in today's modem, pluralistic society, we must not
assume we can go back to the pure liberal economic model. We
must go on, though, with the pluralistic society which is expressed
by many different groups whose needs may be satisfied in many
different ways. These functional entities will nonetheless contrib-
ute to the spirit and actualities of the democratic whole.
89. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract in ESSENTIAL ROUSSEAU 57 (L. Bair trans. 1974).
90. E. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 70
(1973). Schumacher says: "[Pleople can be themselves only in small comprehensive
groups. Therefore we must learn to think in terms of an articulated structure that can cope
with a multiplicity of small-scale units. If economic thinking can not grasp this it is use-
less." Id
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Marked by his concern for finding the right way to reconcile
conflicting demands of stability and change in the law, Benjamin
Nathan Cardozo gained an international reputation for his skill in
harmonizing legal rules and social values. In The Paradoxes of
Legal Science, Justice Cardozo affirms the Lockean statement that
"the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and
enlarge freedom."92 And just as freedom needs preserving, so too
do certain business practices, operating within the liberal eco-
nomic mode, require preservation and safekeeping by the law.
Herein, the municipal utility occupies a special and successful
niche in business enterprise.
Municipal ownership, when limited to natural monopolies, has
a most definite liberal economic character. As a result of its small
size, purely local interest, and profit orientation, this form of
public control maintains prominent liberal economic val-
ues-individualism and self-determination, and by limiting direct
state control, it responds to the preoccupation of laissez-faire with
curtailing government largesse.
The dignity of constitutional sanction, contemporary recogni-
tion of Home Rule's grass roots democratic faith, and the insis-
tance upon profit provide a sound basis for preserving and
encouraging freedom and independence of municipal utility oper-
ation.
92. B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 94 (1928).
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